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Abstract—Contextual proximity detection (or, co-presence de-
tection) is a promising approach to defend against relay attacks
in many mobile authentication systems. We present a systematic
assessment of co-presence detection in the presence of a context-
manipulating attacker. First, we show that it is feasible to manip-
ulate, consistently control and stabilize the readings of different
acoustic and physical environment sensors (and even multiple
sensors simultaneously) using low-cost, off-the-shelf equipment.
Second, based on these capabilities, we show that an attacker
who can manipulate the context gains a significant advantage in
defeating context-based co-presence detection. For systems that
use multiple sensors, we investigate two sensor fusion approaches
based on machine learning techniques – features-fusion and
decisions-fusion, and show that both are vulnerable to contextual
attacks but the latter approach can be more resistant in some
cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
Authentication is critical to many mobile and wireless
systems where one communicating device (prover P) needs
to validate its identity to the other (verifier V). Traditional
cryptographic authentication typically involves a challenge-
response protocol whereby P proves the possession of the
key K that it pre-shares with V by constructing a valid
response to a random challenge sent by V . Examples of
systems where such authentication is deployed include payment
transactions between NFC/RFID devices and point-of-sale
systems, and zero-interaction authentication [10] scenarios
between a token and a terminal (e.g., phone-laptop, or key-car).
Unfortunately, the security and usability benefits provided by
these authentication systems can be subverted by means of
relay attacks, as demonstrated by prior research (e.g., [14],
[15]), which involve two non co-present colluding attackers,
one near P and one near V , simply relaying protocol messages
back and forth between P and V .
A known defense to relay attacks is distance bounding,
where a challenge-response authentication protocol allows
V to measure an upper-bound of its distance from P [9].
Using this protocol, V can verify whether P is within a
close proximity thereby detecting the presence of relay attacks
[14], [15]. However, distance bounding systems may not be
currently feasible on commodity devices (such as smartphones
or payment tokens) due to their sensitivity to measurement
errors (of elapsed time).
The presence of ubiquitous and low-cost sensing capabilities
on many modern mobile devices has facilitated a potentially
more viable relay attack defense [17], [27], [21], [16]. This
defense leverages the notion of “context” derived from on-
board device sensors based on which P-V proximity, or lack
of it, could be determined. In other words, in a benign setting,
where P and V are co-present, both would record a similar
context with a high probability. In contrast, if the system is
subject to a relay attack, and P and V are non co-present,
devices’ context should be different with a high probability.
Extensive recent prior work demonstrated the feasibility of
using different types of sensor modalities for such contextual
co-presence detection, including audio [17], radio (WiFi [27],
Bluetooth [26] and GPS [16], and the physical environment
(temperature, humidity, gas and altitude/pressure) [24]. Many
single modalities, such as audio and WiFi, were shown to
be performing quite well for contextual co-presence detection
resulting in low false negatives (i.e., rejecting a co-presence
instance; a measure of usability) and low false positives
(accepting a non co-presence instance; a measure of security). In
addition, fusion of multiple modalities, including combination
of audio-radio [26], and combination of physical sensors [24],
has been shown to further reduce false negatives and false
positives.
Our Contributions: The focus of prior work on contextual co-
presence detection largely centered on evaluating the system’s
security under the assumption that it is very hard to manipulate
the contextual environment (i.e., it considered only a Dolev-Yao
attacker [13]). In this paper, we are extending this model to the
realm of a context-manipulating attacker. There are two main
parts and contributions of the paper, as summarized below:
1. Novel Context Manipulation Attacks: We show that it is
feasible to manipulate the readings of different sensors (and
combinations thereof) using low-cost, off-the-shelf equipment,
representing a realistic attacker. We demonstrate attacks against
a variety of modalities studied in prior work including audio,
radio (Bluetooth/WiFi), and physical (temperature, humidity,
gas and altitude).
Our work is the first to consider context-manipulation
attacks against audio and physical modalities. In particular, we
demonstrate how an attacker in close proximity of the sensors
can successfully manipulate the physical environment “seen”
by these sensors, without the need to manipulate the global
surrounding environment or compromise the devices/sensors
themselves. Our attacks are described in Section III.
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2. Co-Presence Detection with Context Manipulations: Based
on the above manipulation capabilities, we comprehensively
examine and quantify the advantage a multi-modality attacker,
who can manipulate multiple sensor modalities simultaneously,
can have in defeating co-presence detection over a zero-
modality attacker (one studied in prior work). To accomplish
this, we re-orchestrated the co-presence detection approaches
based on machine learning techniques in audio-only [17], audio-
radio [26], physical [24] and a (newly-proposed) audio-radio-
physical systems, in a way that non co-present data samples
were manipulated for different modality combinations. Our
results show that the attacker advantage increases many-folds
in several cases (Table II quantifies the attacker success rates).
For systems that use multiple modalities, we investigate two
different sensor fusion approaches – features-fusion (proposed
in [26]) and decisions-fusion based on majority voting, and
show that both approaches are vulnerable to contextual attacks
but the latter can be more resistant in some cases, at the
cost of slight degradation in usability. Our detailed analysis is
presented in Section IV.
Broader Impact and Lessons Learned: Our work represents
the first concrete step towards analyzing, extending and
systematizing prior work on contextual co-presence detection
under a stronger, but realistic adversarial model. It suggests that
tampering with context may not be as difficult as previously
believed, and the security offered by contextual co-presence
detection is therefore weaker. Although a sophisticated attacker
would likely fare better at manipulating the context (compared
to our attacks), we also suggest potential strategies (including
decisions fusion) that may still be used to strengthen the security
of co-presence detection against a multi-modality attacker
(Section V). At a broader level, our work calls the security of
contextual co-presence detection into question, and motivates
the need of re-evaluating the security of other context-centric
systems in the face of context manipulation. For instance,
our work may be extended to analyze the security of other
promising context-based systems such as contextual access
control [20] with respect to context-manipulating adversaries.
II. BACKGROUND AND MODELS
A. Relay Attacks and Contextual Co-Presence Detection
The goal of the adversary against a challenge-response
authentication system is to fool V into concluding that P
is nearby and thus needs access to V even when P is
actually far away. The attacker possesses standard Dolev-Yao
capabilities [13]: it has complete control of the communication
channel over which the authentication protocol between P and
V is run but does not have physical possession of P nor is
able to compromise (e.g., through malware) either P or V .
The attacker could take the form of a “ghost-and-leech” [18]
duo (Ap, Av) such that Ap (respectively Av) is physically
close to P (V), and Ap and Av communicate over a high-
speed connection. Such an adversary pair can compromise
the security of traditional challenge-response authentication
by simply initiating a protocol session between P and V ,
relaying messages between them, leading V to conclude that P
is in proximity. This is an attack applicable to zero-interaction
authentication systems. A similar attack applies to proximity-
based payment systems [12], [14].
Co-presence detection schemes aim to address such relay
attacks. Figure 1(a) shows a typical system model of an authen-
tication/authorization protocol using contextual co-presence,
adapted from [26]. In this defense, P (respectively V) pre-
shares a key K (K ′) with a “comparator” C (which may be
part of V or a separate entity, depending on the scenario).
When P sends a trigger to V , it responds with a challenge ch.
P and V then initiate context sensing for a fixed duration t. P
computes a response rsp (using K), appends it to the sensed
context information CP and sends both V , protected by K.
V forwards this to C. In the meantime, V finishes sensing its
own context and sends the resulting context data CV protected
using K ′ to C. C then recovers CP , CV , ch and rsp. It checks
the validity of rsp and compares if CP is sufficiently similar
to CV . If both checks succeed, C concludes that P and V
are co-present. When C is integrated with V , K ′ is not used.
Figure 1(b) shows how contextual co-presence can thwart a
Dolev-Yao relay attacker.
Prior work has proposed the use of different sensor modalities
for such co-presence detection: ambient audio – Au [17], radio
context including WiFi – W and Bluetooth – B [26], and
physical environmental attributes, temperature – T, humidity –
H, concentration of gases – G and altitude – Al [24].
B. Threat Model for a Single-Modality Contextual Attacker
Our focus is on a context-manipulating attacker against
co-presence detection (going beyond a Dolev-Yao attacker).
Truong et al. [26] briefly explored the problem of characterizing
such a contextual attacker. They only consider an attacker
who is capable of manipulating a single sensor modality at a
time (“single-modality attacker”, in our parlance). Again, in
this model, an attacker cannot compromise P and V devices.
Based on the rationale that V is often unattended, whereas
P is in the possession of a human user, they speculated that
the context attacker can manipulate context without detection
only in one direction. More precisely, they modeled a single-
modality attacker as follows:
• Ap, Av can measure the context information that P , V
would sense, respectively.
• Av can fool V into sensing the context information Av
chooses. Specifically Av can receive context information
from Ap and reproduce it near V .
• Av (Ap) cannot suppress any contextual information from
being sensed by V (P).
Figure 1(c) illustrates this threat model. Later in Section
IV, based on our context-manipulation attacks presented in
Section III, this current model will be extended, to incor-
porate multi-modality attackers, who can perform the above
(single-modality) tasks corresponding to multiple modalities
simultaneously.
We reiterate that this model assumes that V is unattended,
and as such, the attacks we will present in this paper are
1ch
2
CP
CV
Prover (P)
(Unattended) Verifier (V)
K
K'
Comparator (C) 
K K',
3
{ch, CV}K'
{rsp, CP}K 4
{rsp, CP}K
{result}K'
CP
CV
Prover (P)
K
K'
Comparator  (C)
K K',
3
4
1
2
Ap
Av
CP
Prover (P)
K
K'
Comparator  (C)
K K',
3
4
1
2
Ap
Av
CP+CV
(a) P and V see the same environment (b) Dolev-Yao attackers (c) (Uni/bi)-directional single-modality and 
multiple-modality attackers
CP
ch
{rsp, CP}K
{ch, CV}K'
{rsp, CP}K
{result}K'
{ch, CV}K'
{rsp, CP}K
{result}K'
ch
{rsp, CP}K
(Unattended) Verifier (V) (Unattended) Verifier (V)
CO
CO
CO
CO
CO
Fig. 1: System model of proximity based authentication with contextual co-presence. In our work, the unidirectional single-modal attacker
model [26] is extended to bidirectional and multiple-modality attackers (highlighted with blue arrows). Radio sensors and Gas are subject to
bidirectional attacks in our new model.
based on this assumption. Vehicles parked in underground
parking lots/decks represent an apt example of unattended
verifiers. Relay attacks against such vehicles have already been
demonstrated in [15]. Other examples include stolen laptops
in a zero-interaction authentication system. Payment scenarios,
such as those involving parking meters or remote gas station
pumps, also involve unattended payment terminals and are thus
also vulnerable to our attacks.
III. CONTEXT MANIPULATION ATTACKS
A. Manipulating Audio Sensor Modality
To manipulate ambient audio, an adversary must find a
way to make ambient audio on one side similar to that on
the other side. Recall from Section II that our threat model
allows the attacker to add to the ambient audio at V’s side
without being noticed, allowing him to relay/stream the ambient
audio in real-time from P’s side to V’s side thereby causing
the features used for audio correlation almost match at both
sides. The assumption that manipulating audio at V’s side can
go undetected is valid since V may be unattended in many
scenarios (as our model in Section II assumed). The attacker
duo can use any reliable audio streaming tool to stream the
audio from P’s side to V’s side. They can execute this attack
conveniently using mobile phones and wireless data connection.
We evaluated how well such an attacker can succeed in fooling
audio-based co-presence detection by streaming ambient audio
using Skype [1]. We use the features and classifier described
in prior work [17]. Our results are presented in Section IV-B.
B. Manipulating Radio-Frequency Sensor Modalities
Prior work suggests that manipulating the radio context is
possible in general. The work presented in [25] describes
attacks on a public WiFi-based positioning system. They
used a Linux laptop as an Access Point (AP) with the
Scapy packet manipulation program [6] to spoof WiFi APs.
Similarly, spoofing bluetooth device addresses has already
been demonstrated in prior work [19], [26], both of which
reported bluetooth-based relay attacks. An attacker can control
the received signal strength by controlling the transmission
power of his masquerading devices. Therefore, we conclude
that the threat model assumed in [26] (see Section II-B) is
reasonable. Furthermore, in the case of RF sensor modalities,
it is reasonable to assume that an attacker can also manipulate
the RF environment at P’s end without being noticed (since
radio waves are imperceptible to human users). Therefore,
limiting the attacker to unidirectional manipulation only is too
restrictive.
We tested the feasibility of WiFi spoofing ourselves, and
studied how it can be used to match the WiFi context at two
ends. In our experiment, we used a Linksys router (WRT54G)
to create a spoofed hotspot. We flashed DD-WRT firmware
[11] to the router since the default firmware did not allow us to
spoof the Basic Service Set Identifier (BSSID). The router used
in our experiment is portable, easily available in the market,
and much cheaper than other devices which can also be used
to spoof the hotspot such as laptops or smartphones.
The DD-WRT control panel also provides an option to
change the transmission (TX) power with which we can in-
crease/decrease the signal strength. The normal signal strength
for the router detected by our target device (a MacBook Air
laptop) was around -39 dBm. The router and the target device
were located around 30 cm apart. Merely by adjusting router
settings, we were able to vary the signal strength of the router,
as sensed by the target device, between -25 dBm and -48
dBm. By changing the distance between the target device and
the spoofed router, we were able to further reduce the signal
strength down to -87 dBm. This suggests that the adversary has
a high degree of control in manipulating sensed signal strength.
Based on this spoofing and Received Signal Strength Indicator
(RSSI) manipulation capability, the WiFi context matching
attack becomes rather straightforward. The attacker can even
have advantage in environments where number of WiFi APs
is low. For example, we observed that there are less than five
APs in outdoors such as parking lot. In such cases, the attacker
would only need to spoof P’s side.
C. Manipulating Physical Environment Sensor Modalities
As discussed in [24], it may seem hard to manipulate physical
modalities, Temperature T, Humidity H, Gas G and Altitude
Al. For example, it appears that an adversary has to change the
temperature or humidity of the entire environment surrounding
the victim device which may be quite challenging or detected
easily. However, in this section, we show that, by using off-the-
shelf devices, manipulating physical context is not only feasible
but also realistic and effective by tampering with the “local”
environment close to one of the devices (e.g., an unattended
V). Our attacks do not require the compromise of the devices
(V or P), but rather only manipulation of environment close to
their sensors. In order to monitor the current ambient readings
as they are being changed, the attacker has to use his sensors.
These ambient readings serve as a feedback for the attacker
while he attempts to change the current V’s ambience. The
feedback sensor needs to be placed very close to the victim
sensor so that the two provide similar readings.
Our experiments demonstrate how different contextual
modalities can be manipulated, controlled and stabilized to
enable successful relay attacks. Arbitrarily changing a sensor’s
readings, at the verifier’s side, based on a physical activity may
be straightforward but consistently maintaining and controlling
these readings to match those at the prover’s side, is non-
trivial. For example, it may be obvious that temperature can
be increased using a hair dryer (a simple tool used in our
temperature manipulation experiments), but how to maintain it
at a desired level for a reasonable period of time (during which
the attack can be launched) is not obvious. While we present
several direct/explicit ways to manipulate many modalities,
we also demonstrate some indirect/implicit techniques. For
example, we show how altitude can be manipulated by changing
pressure (i.e., without relocating the device to a different
altitude). When performing the attacks, we need to consider
that the attacker will not have access to the direct readings from
the actual (V) device and hence has to use his own sensors to
monitor the current ambient readings during the attack. These
ambient readings serve as a feedback for the attacker while
he attempts to change the current V’s ambience. The feedback
sensor needs to be placed close to the victim sensor so that
both provide similar readings.
1) Temperature Manipulation: We were able to successfully
alter the temperature to a desired level using various household
items, such as a hair dryer, a coffee mug, and ice cubes. All
of our experiments were performed with Sensordrone devices
serving as both V and the attacker’s feedback sensor.
Increasing the Temperature: In situations where P (e.g., a
car key indoors) is at a higher temperature than V (e.g., a
car parked outside in winter), the attacker must increase the
temperature. We first used a hair dryer to heat-up the area
around the Sensordrone such that the temperature is increased
to a desired level. To monitor how the temperature increases as
we bring the hair dryer closer to V , we first placed the hair dryer
far enough and then brought the hair dryer closer to the sensors
in a way that we can handle the increase in temperature gradient.
In our experiment, we first tried to increase the temperature
to 40 °C and then to 35 °C. After few attempts, we could
successfully increase the temperature to a desired level and
stabilize for almost 2 minutes ( Fig. 2). The lab temperature
when the experiments were performed was around 26 to 27
°C. The hair dryer we used [4] had a power of 1875 watt AC.
A video demonstration of our attack has been uploaded to
YouTube [5].
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Fig. 3: V S and FS on same location; the attacker trying to increase
temperature to 35 °C.
Our next set-up uses two sensors, V sensor (V S) and
feedback sensor (FS), to change the temperature. Depending
on whether or not the attacker knows where the sensor is
precisely located on V device, he may place FS either exactly
on top of V S or away from it. We performed the hair dryer
test such that: (1) FS is placed at the same place as V S; (2)
FS is placed such that V S is closer to hair dryer than FS;
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Fig. 4: Heating an area; V S and FS within a range of 15 cm; the
attacker trying to increase temperature to 35 °C.
and (3) FS is placed such that FS is closer to hair dryer than
V S.
For the first case, we were able to match the temperature
on both sensors to a large extent when performing the heating
activity (Figure 3). However, if the attacker does not know the
location of V S then the sensor device closer to the hair dryer
ends up getting more heated. These attacks are described in
Appendix A in detail. Hence, the attacker should heat up the
whole area as he may not be able to place his FS exactly on
top of V S. Subsequently, we tried to apply the heat not just
focusing on one particular area but rather heating the entire
area within a range of 15 cm. Using this approach, we could
effectively change the temperature around V S with feedback
from FS as the two temperature curves move side by side
(Figure 4). We were able to control the temperature to a desired
level within a variance of +/-0.3 °C for more than one minute
in FS device.
Decreasing the Temperature: In some scenarios, it might be
necessary for the attacker to reduce the temperature recorded
by V (e.g., when P is indoors and V is outdoors during summer
conditions). To decrease the temperature readings, we used an
ice cube and rubbed it against the sensor. The environment
on the other hand increased the temperature. By using the ice
cube, we first tried to drop the temperature below 20 °C and
then let the environment increase the temperature naturally.
This natural increase of the temperature was very slow, and
when the temperature started increasing beyond the desired
temperature level, we gently rubbed the ice again to stabilize
the temperature. We conducted experiment in a parking deck
where the ambient temperature was around 30 °C. Our goal
was to change the temperature down to 25 °C. We rubbed the
ice cube on the sensors (both V and feedback sensors) until
the temperature decreased to less than 20 °C. Afterwards, the
temperature started rising slowly naturally. When it reached
around 25.2 °C, the ice cube was rubbed gently again on the
sensors such that the temperature drops slightly. We were able
to decrease the temperature and stabilize it at 25 °C for more
than a minute after few trials within a variance of +/-0.3 °C
as shown in Figure 5.
2) Humidity Manipulation: To alter humidity, we used
common household items such as hot coffee (for increasing
humidity) and hair dryer (for decreasing humidity).
Increasing the Humidity: Coffee fumes when brought close
to V S would increase the humidity level. An attacker has to
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Fig. 5: Decreasing temperature with an ice cube; the attacker trying
to decrease to 25 °C.
move the hot coffee cup nearer to, and farther away, from the
sensors to control the humidity level. Using this strategy, we
were able to increase the humidity by 10%, i.e., from normal
humidity of 55% to 65% ( Fig. 6). The attacker needs to use
FS to control the humidity. On our first attempt, we were able
to control the humidity with a variance of +/-3% for almost 30
seconds. In the second attempt, we could raise the humidity
to the desired level for more than one minute (106 seconds)
with the same threshold.
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Decreasing the Humidity: A hair dryer can be used to dry-up
the air around the sensor to reduce the humidity. The setup
of this experiment is similar to the hair dryer temperature
increase experiment. We tried to decrease the humidity of V S
by monitoring the humidity change on FS. When two devices
are placed exactly at the same location, the humidity decreases
and matches consistently between the two devices ( Fig. 7).
Even when the two devices are placed 15 cm apart, the drop
in the humidity readings coincides ( Fig. 8).
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3) Gas Manipulation: Following prior work [24], we study
Carbon Monoxide (CO) level as a modality for co-presence
detection. While manipulating this modality, an attacker may
not be detected even when he alters the gas content near
either V or P (unlike the rudimentary model of Section
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Fig. 8: Decreasing humidity with hair dryer such that V S and FS
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II-B), unless there is a significantly large change, or gas
monitors are installed. This provides flexibility to the attacker
to increase/decrease the CO level at both sides such that both
readings match.
Increasing the Gas (CO): We performed several activities
such as using a smoking cigarette to exhale a high amount of
CO gas to the sensor, and using a car exhaust to increase the
CO level. We also found out that room heaters emit gases which
increase CO readings when we placed the sensor device on top
the gas vent while the heater was turned on. The aerosol spray
also increased the CO level when it was sprayed around on
top of the sensor. The effect of different propane gas heaters
as well as aerosols air fresheners on gas content has been
mentioned in [8]. All these activities, though, increased the CO
level abruptly, it takes a long time for sensor reading to descend
back to normal, which provides the attacker with a sufficiently
long attack window as shown in Fig. 9. The effects of cigarette
and car exhaust on CO level are described in Appendix B in
detail. We observed these activities for more than five times,
and noticed that it took more than thirty seconds to decrease
by 1 ppm when gas level decreased below 10 ppm which is
already above average of normal gas level.
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Decreasing the Gas (CO): To reduce the gas level, an attacker
needs to “purify” the air from the CO content around the
sensors. We implemented this strategy using a kitchen exhaust
fan which is used to remove pollutants. We found that when
sensor was placed near the exhaust fan, it decreased the CO
gas content.
The gas reading heavily depends upon the location of P and
V . In a heavy traffic or polluted area, this may be higher than
10 ppm while in a normal workplace, it may be around 0 ppm
to 5 ppm. If P is located in low CO area while V is located
in high CO area, the attacker may use the kitchen exhaust fan
activity to decrease the CO level in V’s location. However, if
the attacker cannot reduce the CO level by significant amount,
he can always collude with the attacker at P’s side to increase
the CO level using an aerosol spray. This can increase the CO
level by significant amount and then it only takes a while to
fall back to the normal gas level. This effect can be confirmed
from Fig. 9.
4) Altitude Manipulation: The altitude of a location is
inversely correlated to the pressure at that location. The
Sensordrone device detects the pressure, and uses it to calculate
the altitude based on a standard conversion method.
Manipulating sensors so as to increase or decrease altitude
directly seems very difficult. In order to manipulate the altitude
readings, one may physically carry the verifier device to a
higher or lower altitude as needed. If the verifier device is
portable (such as a stolen laptop), doing so is easy. However,
there are many scenarios where directly changing the altitude
is not feasible (e.g., when V is a car and P is a car key
carried in victim’s pocket). We show that it is still possible
to manipulate altitude readings indirectly by manipulating the
pressure readings.
Increasing the Altitude: To increase the altitude indirectly,
an attacker must decrease the pressure near the sensors. To
achieve this functionality, we created a low-cost air compressor.
We placed the sensor inside a Ziploc bag and then used an
electric air pump [3] to suck-up the air from the bag. When
V is large in size or shape (such as a car), an attacker just
needs to create an enclosure around its sensor, while if it is a
portable/small device (e.g., a laptop), the device itself can be
placed inside a bag. When the air pump sucks up the air around
the sensors enclosed inside the Ziploc bag, the weight of air
exerted on the sensor is reduced. This reduces the pressure
around the sensor and hence increases the altitude level. In our
experiment, we effectively altered the altitude by more than 60
meters (Fig. 10). By using an air pump with a higher power,
the attacker can further increase the altitude level. A vacuum
cleaner may also be used in place of an air pump (as described
in Appendix C).
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Fig. 10: Using an air pump to change pressure to the sensors wrapped
inside a Ziploc bag by pumping air in and out.
Decreasing the Altitude: To decrease the altitude (i.e., in-
crease the pressure), we placed the sensor inside a polythene
bag and applied high pressure by squeezing the bag, blowing
air into the bag, and finally using the air pump device to blow
the air inside. First, we wrapped the sensor inside a polythene
bag to see if there is any change in altitude when we blow air
into the bag by mouth, or squeeze the air tight polythene bag.
This increased the pressure by very high amount and decreased
the altitude correspondingly. However, it was not doable in
a controlled way, i.e., sometimes the altitude decreased by 5
meters while on other occasions, it decreased by 50 meters.
Ideally, an attacker would want to have a relatively long time
window where the desired altitude remains constant for him
to perform the relay attack. To address this issue, we used
the air pump mentioned above. Filling up the air into the bag
increased the pressure and decreased the altitude such that it
remained constant for almost 14 seconds. A video demo of
this experiment has been uploaded to YouTube [7].
D. Manipulating Multiple Sensor Modalities Simultaneously
As demonstrated by prior work [17], [26], [24], a contextual
co-presence detection system can use combinations of several
sensor modalities. In such cases, the attacker needs to ma-
nipulate multiple modalities at the same time (multi-modality
attacker). However, performing one activity may be altering not
only the target modality but also one or more other modalities
that a system might be using for context detection, such as
(T and H) or (Al and Au) even though they are not directly
correlated.
For example, hair dryer increases temperature but also dries-
up the air (i.e., potentially reduces the humidity) around the
sensor where it is applied. It also changes the ambient noise. An
attacker needs to manipulate in such a way that if the multiple
modalities are involved in the system he should change the
target modality without altering other modalities by effective
amount. We also found that hair dryer activity results in a huge
momentary change in gas level. However, the reading comes
back to normal when hair dryer is applied for a long period
of time. Altitude and pressure did not change with the hair
dryer activity. Hair dryer activity also does not impact on RF
signals. Hence, hair dryer activity can be used to manipulate
the system which uses either temperature or humidity along
with gas, altitude and RF signals.
Using aerosol spray to increase the gas content does not
have effective change on any other modalities besides humidity.
Similarly, updating RF signals does not seem to have any
effect on physical modalities. Therefore, an attacker can
simultaneously manipulate radio, temperature and gas while
he hopes that audio, altitude and humidity either match the
minimum criteria from both sides or is not used by the system.
Using an ice cube to decrease the temperature does not affect
other modalities effectively. However, if the ice melts then it
may affect the humidity of the space near the sensors. In our
experiment, we saw that humidity fluctuates when we tried to
decrease the temperature using an ice cube. Hence, using an
ice cube to decrease temperature activity can be used with all
other modalities except altitude and humidity.
Hot coffee cup changes the humidity along with the tempera-
ture, while other modalities remain unchanged. In this case, an
attacker can manipulate humidity along with radio, audio and
gas while he cannot control temperature and humidity together.
When an attacker has to use an air pump or vacuum cleaner
to increase or decrease the altitude, it affects ambient noise.
Also, an air pump was used in conjunction with a Ziploc bag
where the sensors were wrapped to create an enclosed space.
When an attacker performs such activity with an enclosed space,
it will be very difficult for him to change gas, temperature
or humidity. We thus may only claim that the attacker can
manipulate altitude along with radio modalities.
To summarize, our attacks support the following combina-
tions of multi-modality manipulations: (1) Al, B, W; (2) Au,
B, G, (increase for H), W; (3) Au, B, G, (decrease for T), W;
(4) Au, B, G, W; (5) B, G, H, W; (6) B, G, T, W. However, a
more sophisticated attacker (than the one we considered) may
use different techniques to possibly attack other combinations
too.
IV. PERFORMANCE OF CO-PRESENCE DETECTION
SYSTEMS UNDER CONTEXT MANIPULATION
In light of the attacks presented in Section III, we first extend
the rudimentary context attacker model from [26] as follows:
• We allow multi-modality attackers who can simultaneously
control multiple sensor modalities, in addition to the single-
modality attacker of [26].
• We assume that a context attacker can manipulate radio
contexts in both directions. The same assumption applies
to gas sensors in light of our aerosol spray attack.
A. Analysis Methodology
To fairly evaluate the resilience of co-presence detection
systems in the presence of our contextual attacker, we used the
same datasets and the same set of features originally used to
evaluate the systems in question. The audio-radio system [26]
used a dataset to evaluate resistance against single-modality
attackers. The physical system [24] used a dataset to model
a zero-modality attacker. We use these datasets to evaluate
the resistance of the respective systems against multi-modality
attackers. In addition, we conducted a set of new audio relaying
experiments to collect a dataset to evaluate the performance of
contextual co-presence detection based on audio. Furthermore,
we collected a new dataset corresponding to the audio-radio-
physical system (which was not considered in prior work).
When evaluating prior systems, we used the same classifi-
cation techniques used in the original evaluations (Decision
Tree and Random Forest), implemented in Scikit-learn [22].
The results are reported after running ten-fold cross validation.
We use False Positive Rate (FPR) as a metric to represent
the attacker’s success probability. FPR corresponds to “non
co-presence” samples which are mislabeled as “co-presence”,
reflecting the security of the system (higher the FPR, lower
the security). We use False Negative Rate (FNR) as a metric
to represent the usability of the system. FNR represents to
“co-presence” samples that are mislabeled as “non co-presence”
(lower the FNR, better the usability). F1 score is reported only
for the overall performance of the classification model under
zero-modality attack.
Whenever multiple sensor modalities are used, we fuse the
data from these modalities before feeding it to the classifier.
We considered the following fusion approaches:
• Features-fusion: The features of all sensor modalities are
together fed to the classifier. The decision of co-presence
or non co-presence is made one-time only based on the
output of the prediction model. This is the approach
followed in prior work [26], [24].
• Decisions-fusion: Each of the n sensors (with all its
features) is used separately by the classifier. As result there
are n decisions made. All decisions are then combined
based on majority voting to produce a final decision.
This is a new approach we are exploring in this paper.
Decisions-fusion can aggregate decisions from single
sensor modalities or from subsets of sensor modalities,
for example, three subsets can be built on top of seven
sensors: acoustic = {Au }, radio = {B, W }, physical =
{Al, G, H, T }. In the latter fusion approach, classifiers
of subsets are built using features-fusion.
B. Audio-Only System
Halevi et al. [17] proposed the use of (only) audio for co-
presence detection. Their work showed that audio is a good
ambient context resulting in 100% accuracy and 0% False
Positive Rate (FPR). To assess how an attacker can manipulate
ambient audio via the streaming attack (Section III-A), we
conducted a set of experiments to collect about 100 audio
samples for the non co-presence case. The audio streaming
was done over two different channels: WiFi and cellular data.
P was a Galaxy Nexus device while V was a Galaxy S3 device.
Unidirectional streaming of the audio from P’s side to V’s
side was done between a pair of devices (from a Galaxy S4
to an iPhone 5 in the case of the cellular data channel, and
from a MacBook Air to a ThinkPad Carbon X1 in the WiFi
channel). The attacker devices used a Skype connection as the
audio relay channel.
The audio features used in [17] are based on audio frequency.
Therefore, to evaluate the impact frequency on the attack
feasibility, we tested three different levels of ambient audio
frequencies collected by controlled experiments where we set
up the ambient noise surrounding recording devices falling
into different categories. Low ambient audio (frequency less
than 100 Hz); Medium ambient audio (frequency in the
human audible range, at around 500 Hz); High ambient audio
(frequency 5000 Hz or more).
TABLE I: Relay attack success rate (FPR) for audio streaming via
WiFi and Cellular networks
Acoustic relaying environments WiFi Cellular
(P freq → V freq)
High → Medium 100% 40%
High → Low 100% 20%
Medium → Medium 100% 0%
Medium → Low 100% 60%
Low → Low 20% 0%
Others 0% 0%
We used the dataset for ambient audio of previous work [26]
which collected ambient acoustic data to build the classification
model (F1 of 0.86 and FPR of 9.3%). The 100 samples we
collected via audio streaming channels are fed to the classifier
for prediction. Table I presents the FPR of non co-presence
detection under the streaming attacks over WiFi and cellular
data channels. The results indicate that the attacker (1) has
a higher chance of success using the WiFi channel and (2)
could be thwarted when either the ambient audio at P is low
frequency or if the ambient audio at V is high frequency.
This simple streaming attack with commodity devices shows
that the audio-only system is highly vulnerable to relay attacks,
especially via the WiFi channel. The attack has very high
success rate regardless of hardware variations and network
delays inherent to streaming. However, an attacker can succeed
only when relaying ambient audio from a higher frequency
acoustic environment to a similar or lower frequency acoustic
environment, such that, the higher frequency dominates the
lower frequency, and makes V falsely record P’s ambient noise
instead of the real “localized” ambient noise.
The audio features we used, i.e., the ones proposed in [17],
are not sensitive to time synchronization. This is effective in
terms of co-presence detection (i.e., results in very low FNR).
However, as we can see from our experiments, these features
also enable the attacker to succeed in the relay attack with
a very high chance. Other audio features, such as the ones
proposed in [23], require tight synchronization and could be
more resistant to relaying. Unfortunately, because of their high
sensitivity to synchronization, these features did not perform
well in the benign (co-presence) case based on our experiments
(i.e., resulted in high FNR).
C. Audio-Radio System
Truong et al. [26], evaluated the performance of an audio-
radio system against a unidirectional, single-modality attacker.
They showed that while the system achieves good performance
(F1 of 0.98) and high security (FPR of 2.0%), a context attacker
could increase the FPR: from 0.18% to 65.8% (manipulating
W), from 1.1% to 1.2% (B); from 1.62% to 3.01% (audio).
Now, we will analyze the same system against a bi-directional
(for radio), multi-modality attacker. To model the attack, in each
run, the non co-presence samples in the test were transformed
as below.
Audio: Because raw audio data is additive, and one-side context
manipulation for audio is tested, an adversary can be modelled
by replacing V side audio (Xa) to be the sum of its own
ambient audio and P side audio (Xa +Xb).
Radio (B and W): In [26], the set of radio records from two de-
vices A and B are defined as: Sa = {(m(a)i , s(a)i ) | i ∈ Zna−1},
and Sb = {(m(b)i , s(b)i ) | i ∈ Znb−1}, where (m, s) with
m is an identifier and s is associated signal strength of a
beacon; na and nb denote the number of different beacons
(i.e., WiFi access points or Bluetooth devices). The both-
sides context adversary can be modeled by replacing Sa
with Sa ∪ {(m, s) ∀(m, s) ∈ Sb,m 6∈ S(m)a }, and Sb with
Sb ∪ {(m, s) ∀(m, s) ∈ Sa,m 6∈ S(m)b }.
We considered two approaches of fusing sensor data against
bi-directional relay attacks and showed which of them is more
suitable for resisting against the presence of context attackers.
TABLE II: FPRs with/without different contextual attacks in various audio/radio/physical systems. Notations: Sets of manipulated sensors are put inside
curly braces {}. {X˜} denotes an arbitrary set of sensor modalities. Fuse-F: features-fusion, Fuse-D-S: decisions-fusion from single modalities, Fuse-D-M:
decisions-fusion from subsets of modalities. Result highlights: Manipulation of sensor modalities, especially multiple of them, can significantly reduce security
(increase FPR) in most cases. Decisions-fusion can help improve security when dominant sensors are manipulated, but it may reduce usability (increase FNR).
Audio-Radio Physical Audio-Radio-Physical
Fuse-F Fuse-D-S Fuse-F Fuse-D-S Fuse-F Fuse-D-S Fuse-D-M
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2.0% 2.0% 7.5% 13.0% 3.0% 27.1% 6.9%
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(FNR: 1.4%) (FNR: 12.0%) (FNR: 3.9%) (FNR: 14.5%) (FNR: 0.0%) (FNR: 0.3%) (FNR: 0.0%)
(F1: 0.977) (F1: 0.925) (F1: 0.928) (F1: 0.861) (F1:0.990) (F1: 0.923) (F1: 0.980)
{Au}: 3.0% {Au}: 3.0% {T}: 8.3% {T}: 17.0% {Au}: 87.7% {Au}: 45.3% {Au}: 36.9%
{B}: 2.7% {B}: 9.0% {G}: 11.9% {G}: 20.0% {B}: 100% {B}: 45.8% {B}: 36.9%
{W}: 99.8% {W}: 8.0% {H}: 15.3% {H}: 24.4% {W}: 12.3% {W}: 44.8% {W}: 35.0%
{Al}: 55.1% {Al}: 33.1% {Al}: 5.4% {Al}: 37.9% {Al}: 6.9%
{G}: 5.9% {G}: 29.6% {G}: 6.9%
{H}: 3.4% {H}: 29.1% {H}: 6.9%Sin
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{T}: 3.4% {T}: 31.5% {T}: 6.9%
{Au, B}: 3.6% {Au, B}: 96.0% {G, T}: 13.9% {G,T}: 40.1% {B}∪{X˜}: 100% {2 sensors}: {Au, B}∪{X˜}:
{B, W}: 99.8% {Au, W}: 96.0% {G, H}: 15.7% {H, T}: 41.9% 32.0-75.4% > 97.5%
{Au, W}: 100% {B, W}: 100% {H, T}: 29.6% {Al, T}: 50.6% {Au}∪{X˜}>74.9% {3 sensors}: {Au, W}∪{X˜}:
{Au, B, W}: 100% {Au, B, W}: 100% {G, H, T}: 31.1% {G, H}: 57.5% 37.4-97.5% > 88.2%
{Al}∪{X˜}: {Al, H}: 61.2% {X˜}\{Au, B}:< 12.3% {4 sensors}: {Al, G, H, T}:
64.7-100% {Al, G}: 65.5% 97.5-100% 9.9%
rest: 100% rest: 10% {B, W}: 36.9%M
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ti-
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rest: 6.9-87.7%
Table II (columns 1 and 2) presents the analysis results of
training model combining all three audio-radio modalities (Au,
B and W) and testing with different attacks. Zero-modality
attack shows the very low FPR with both fusion methods.
The FNR for decisions-fusion is higher compared to that for
features-fusion. For features-fusion, the results are aligned with
the ones reported in [26].
In single-modality attack, manipulating WiFi, the dominant
feature, results in a very high success rate with features-fusion.
The results change when decisions-fusion was applied. Here,
each sensor contributed equally to the voting process. In such
case, manipulating any single sensor, even the most powerful
one, does not significantly degrade the overall security. The FPR
in case W was manipulated decreases from 99.8% (features-
fusion) down to 8% (decisions-fusion). We recall that the
performance difference of audio and radio sensors is not large
(as reported in [26], F1 ranges from 0.857 for Au to 0.989
for W). This explains why decisions-fusion reduces the overall
performance slightly (F1 reduces from 0.977 to 0.925) in case
of zero-modality attack but significantly improves the security
under a single-modality attack. The security is very low in
multi-modality attack, and neither of the fusion approaches
could restore the security level when majority of the sensors
are under attacker’s control. When manipulating any modality
along with WiFi, the FPR is above 95%. We earlier argued that
audio and radio modalities can be manipulated simultaneously.
D. Physical System
In [24], four physical modalities (Al, H, G, and T) were
introduced for co-presence detection. The performance of the
features-fusion based classifier trained with their dataset is
good (F1 of 0.957, FPR of 5.81%) against a zero-modality
adversary.
Based on our attacks against physical modalities (Section
III-C), we consider an adversary model where an attacker
can manipulate the physical context on one side (unattended
verifier) to match the sensor readings at the other side (prover).
To model this attack, all non co-presence samples in the test
set were transformed to the “attack” value (distance 0). The
distance is set to 0 as data collection in [24] was done by a
single device at a given point of time, hence, no hardware effect
or calibration error was taken into account. The non co-presence
class in the dataset is about 18 times larger than co-presence
class. To correct this imbalance, we applied the same under-
sampling as in [24]: we divided the non co-presence samples
into 19 subsets, and ran several rounds of cross validation
taking 10 subsets in each round and aggregating the results in
the end. In addition to the features-fusion employed in [24], we
tested the decisions fusion similar to our audio-radio system
analysis in the previous section.
Table II (columns 3 and 4) shows our analysis results. The
system performance in zero-modality attack is well-aligned
with the one reported in [24]. As in [24], among four physical
modalities, Al performs the best. Consequently, manipulating
only Al degrades the security vastly with features-fusion (FPR
increases to over 50%). Decisions-fusion in general brings
lower security and lower performance/usability in zero-modality
attack and single-modality attack. However, it avoids the
dominance of sole sensor in case the attacker can control such
sensor (Al in this case). Decisions-fusion can also help improve
security against a multi-modality attacker who manipulates Al
along with other sensors. Compared to audio-radio system,
in physical system, attacking each single modality results in
higher success rate.
E. Audio-Radio-Physical System
We extended the data collector used in [26] to record physical
sensor data using an attached Sensordrone device (as used in
[24]). Different device models were used to record sensor
data. Each device, in a pair of devices, was connected to
its own Sensordrone device. Two users were involved in the
data collection. Data was collected at different locations in
two countries for ten days. The resulting dataset has 203 non
co-presence samples and 335 co-presence samples.
Unlike the dataset for physical sensors ([24]) which was
collected from one device at a time only, we collected data
from pairs of devices, and therefore hardware variance and
calibration errors between co-presence device sensors need to
be taken into account. When we try to model the contextual
attack on given sensor(s), distance 0 does not ensure that
the attack will succeed. As the classifier is trained with data
which may contains noise, we compute the mode of the
histogram for distance values for the co-presence samples.
As the data aggregated is from two participants, histograms of
distance values are not uninomial but multinomial. Multinomial
distribution implies several modes. For each physical sensor,
we choose a mode value and assign it as the distance value.
The mode values for Al, G, H and T are 13.54, 0.3, 6.61 and
0.153, respectively. As the manipulation by replacing the radio
data at both sides has to be identical, the distance features for
radio sensors are set to 0.
Table II (columns 5, 6, 7) reports our analysis results with
different fusion methods. Under zero-modality attack, features-
fusion performs the best while decisions-fusion from single
modalities performs the worst. Features-fusion uses all possible
features for training so that the classifier can be built based on
the best features or best combination of features (B and Au
with our current dataset). Thus, it returns the best results (in
the absence of context manipulation) compared to any other
ways of fusing sensor data. Decisions-fusion based on single
modalities lets the worst sensors being able to contribute to the
voting scheme, thus bringing down the overall performance.
This is the case in our dataset where radio sensors and audio
sensor perform better than physical sensors. Note that if all
sensors perform equally well, features-fusion and decisions-
fusion would not differ much. Decisions-fusion from subsets
of sensors has a moderate performance, worse than features-
fusion but better than decisions-fusion from single modalities.
This hybrid approach avoids mis-learning as in the case of
using a single modality only.
Let us now assess the security of this co-presence detection
system when any single modality is controlled by the attacker.
Depending on how sensors are fused, the impact of manipulated
sensor varies. In features-fusion, as the classifier decision relies
on the best features of dominant sensors, the FPR increases
drastically when such sensors are manipulated (i.e. Au or B
in our dataset). In contrast, when weaker sensors (physical or
W) are manipulated, it has a relatively small impact on the
security as the resulting FPR increases a bit compared to a
zero-modal attack (especially for W). Decisions-fusion reduces
attacker success rate when single sensor is manipulated, for
example, FPR of manipulating B decreases from 100% to
36.9%. Recall that manipulating single sensor is not difficult
as we demonstrated in Section III.
An attacker has the highest chance to succeed if he can
control the dominant sensors or a subset of sensors that contain
the dominant sensors. In such case, the success rate could
reach 100% with only one single dominant sensor (i.e. B in
our dataset) if the system uses features-fusion or with majority
dominant sensors (i.e. Au and B). In most cases, attacking the
set of weak sensors (e.g. {Al, G, H, T}) does not impact the
security much, except when system uses decision fusion from
single modalities.
V. DISCUSSION
Reducing Attack Success with Decisions Fusion: In the
previous section on analysis of an audio-radio-physical system,
we showed that decisions-fusion reduces attack success rates
in cases where the minority of the sensors are manipulated.
However, this may come at the cost of higher FNR which
represents the usability of co-presence systems. Decisions-
fusion from single sensors improves security when individual
sensors perform well. However, it increases the attack success
rate for weak sensors as they equally contribute to the voting.
For example, to the audio-radio-physical system, attacking
weak sensors such as H or G brings relatively high success
rate compared to features fusion. Decisions-fusion from subsets
of sensors reduces the FPR in general especially when dominant
sensors are controlled by the attacker.
Other Potential Countermeasures: Typically, during the au-
thentication/deauthentication process, the prover moves nearer
to/farther away from the verifier. In this case, the radio signals
changes gradually, i.e., if prover and verifier move towards
APs, then new APs will be shown, or their signal strengths will
continuously grow, while if they move further away from APs,
their strengths will decrease or the APs will not be visible at
all. If the verifier or prover device detects much more APs (or
Bluetooth devices) nearby all of a sudden, it probably indicates
a radio manipulation attack. The system can be made aware
of such situations.
We noticed that when the verifier is in an environment
which has high frequency noise, an attacker tends to fail with
audio streaming. This can be used to design an active defense
mechanism such that whenever audio contextual information
is requested, the verifier can emit a high frequency audio. This
audio signal can be for a short duration, and does not need
to be loud (not high amplitude). As a result, the chances of
attacker succeeding in a relay attack could be reduced.
Limitations and Future Work: There are certain limitations
of our work. The dataset we used for analyzing the attacks in
audio-radio-physical system is relatively small. It was collected
from limited number of devices. It might not represent all
possible scenarios and environments. However, it was sufficient
to demonstrate the impact of attacks and defensive solutions.
It gave insights for better understanding of the contextual co-
presence detection system and possible defenses to improve
security against different contextual attacks. Further work may
be needed to collect and analyze a larger scale dataset to
evaluate this system. The decisions-fusion from subsets of
sensors seems to be the most appropriate solution for improving
security against context manipulation attacks. However, we
have analyzed it only with three subsets: acoustic (Au), radio
(B, W) and physical subsets (Al, G, H, T). In design of a real
system in the future, we would like to test different subsets
combinations to find the best candidate for fusion.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Contextual co-presence detection has been shown to be a very
promising relay attack defense in many mobile authentication
settings suitable for off-the-shelf, sensor-equipped devices. We
presented a systematic assessment of co-presence detection
in the presence of a context-manipulating attacker. Our work
suggests that tampering with the context can be achieved with
simple yet effective strategies, and the security offered by co-
presence detection is therefore weaker than previously believed.
We also suggested potential countermeasures (e.g., decisions
fusion based machine learning) that may be used to strengthen
the security of co-presence detection against a multi-modality
attacker. Some of these countermeasure may require a thorough
future investigation, which we plan to pursue.
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APPENDIX
A. Increasing the temperature when the attacker does not know
V S’s location
An attacker who doesn’t know the location of V S will try
to keep the FS as close as possible and perform the attack
activity. In our experiment, we placed the FS 10 cm apart
from the V S and performed 1) when the hair dryer is closer to
V S as shown in Fig. 11, and 2) when the hair dryer is closer
to FS as shown in Fig. 12.
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Fig. 11: Increasing the temperature; location of V S unknown to the
attacker; V S is 10 cm closer to hair dryer than FS; the attacker
trying to increase temperature to 35 °C.
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Fig. 12: Increasing the temperature; location of V S unknown to the
attacker; FS is 10 cm closer to hair dryer than V S; the attacker
trying to increase temperature to 35 °C.
B. Increasing the CO gas level
We effectively manipulated the CO gas sensor using cigarette
and car exhaust. The increase in the gas level due to the activity
is abrupt when CO is blown onto the sensors, however, it takes
a while for the sensors to fall back to normal readings. This
provides an enough time window for the attacker as depicted
in Figs 13 and 14.
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Fig. 13: Effect of cigarette in CO level; increasing the gas content to
an arbitrary value and waiting to decrease to desired level.
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Fig. 14: Effect of car exhaust in CO level; increasing the CO gas
level to arbitrary value and wait to decrease to desired level.
C. Increasing the altitude using a car vacuum
As an alternative to air pump, we tried a portable car vacuum
cleaner for inducing an altitude increase. When we hovered
the vacuum cleaner pipe around the sensors, it did not have
any effect. However, when we put the pipe just on top of the
sensor, it increased the altitude by 10-11 meters as shown in
Fig. 15. An attacker can adjust the altitude to a desired level
by changing the power level of the vacuum cleaner, similar
to the air pump manipulation. The earlier part of the Fig. 15
shows a little fluctuation in altitude when we hovered the pipe
around the sensors while the later spikes clearly show that
there was an increase of almost 10 meters when the pipe was
touched to the sensors. A video demo of our attack has been
uploaded to YouTube [2] to show the effect of portable car
vacuum cleaner on the pressure/altitude sensors.
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Fig. 15: Using a car vacuum cleaner to reduce pressure around the
sensor and increase the altitude.
